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Abstract:  
 
While decades ago innovative organizations were particularly known for their product 
innovations, nowadays this label is reserved for organizations that are able to adapt to changing 
landscapes by redesigning their business models. At the turn of the last century globalization was 
the driving force behind intensifying competition, and large international players were able to 
change the rules of the game. A decade later, the web-based economy – with powerful players 
such as Amazon, Alibaba, Netflix, and Google – is again redefining traditional sector boundaries 
and distribution methods and is forcing incumbents to either play by the new rules or quit. 
Playing by these new rules means being innovative by quickly adapting the business model and 
implementing the required changes successfully. 
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Article:  
 
‘There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more 
uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of 
things.’ 
– Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–1527) 
 
The number one organizational challenge 
 
While decades ago innovative organizations were particularly known for their product 
innovations, nowadays this label is reserved for organizations that are able to adapt to changing 
landscapes by redesigning their business models. At the turn of the last century globalization was 
the driving force behind intensifying competition, and large international players were able to 
change the rules of the game. A decade later, the web-based economy – with powerful players 
such as Amazon, Alibaba, Netflix, and Google – is again redefining traditional sector boundaries 
and distribution methods and is forcing incumbents to either play by the new rules or quit. 
Playing by these new rules means being innovative by quickly adapting the business model and 
implementing the required changes successfully. 
 
Managing change is the number one challenge identified by 48% of the businesses worldwide in 
a recent study. When organizations don’t respond to developments in the environment their 
survival becomes threatened. The potential detrimental effect of a lack of organizational change 
is demonstrated by examples such as Howard Johnson's, Rexall Drug, Stuckey's, Blockbuster 
and Movie Gallery. In 2004, Blockbuster had over 9,000 company-owned and franchised units in 
the US with almost 60,000 employees. In 2010, it filed for bankruptcy due to not responding to 
competition from Netflix and Redbox. In 2013, it closed all its remaining company-owned stores 
and only the 50 franchised units remained open. Movie Gallery was the second largest retail 
movie rental store behind Blockbuster. It grew through the 2000s through acquisitions and 
takeovers, acquiring Hollywood Video. The company filed for bankruptcy in 2010 and closed its 
doors for the same reasons as Blockbuster. 
 
Despite the importance of organizational change, 50–70% of changes fail during 
implementation. Implementing changes is especially challenging in chain organizations since 
they are a specific organizational form with unique problems. Chains typically become 
successful by replicating an attractive business format in a large number of units in different 
geographical locations. Well-known examples are McDonald's, Wal-Mart, Subway, Supercuts, 
CVS, Baskin Robbins, Home Depot, Holiday Inn, and 7-Eleven. Implementing chain-wide 
changes is a difficult challenge because units with varying characteristics and different 
geographical circumstances all have to adopt the same changes in a limited time period to 
maintain chain uniformity and economies of scale. 
 
Introducing chain-wide changes is particularly difficult when units are owned by franchisees. 
Franchisees are independent business owners who make financial investments to adopt a 
franchisor's business format. Despite their investments in a more or less standardized format, 
franchisees typically have a certain desire for entrepreneurial autonomy and their goals may not 
always be aligned to headquarters’ goals. When confronted with franchisor-initiated change, 
franchisees may thus adopt different responses and these responses largely affect the success of 
the change implementation process. Yet very little is known about how to implement changes in 
franchise chains and how to manage franchisee responses. 
 
Change in franchised chains 
 
While franchising was introduced in the US around 1850 by Isaac Merritt Singer and Cyrus Hall 
McCormick, the international launch of franchising began in the 1950s and 60s. Since then, 
franchising accounts for about 50 percent of retail trade in the US, 67 percent in Japan, and 44 
percent of all retail trade worldwide. A recent survey among national franchise associations of 21 
European countries points at over 12,000 franchised brands, about 750 of which are represented 
in a small country such as the Netherlands. International franchising is predicted to continue 
growing; 32% of the top US franchisors now operate units outside the US. 
 
The popularity of franchising is understandable because it facilitates fast chain growth since 
franchisees invest their own resources in building and managing their units and are typically very 
committed to making their units successful. However, a main disadvantage for the franchisor is 
that franchising involves the complexity of managing a multitude of franchise relationships with 
legally independent franchisees that have their own goals. Examples of these complexities 
include Subway that suffered multiple lawsuits from their franchisees for putting units close 
together geographically, and Oil & Vinegar where franchisees contacted the Dutch media and 
filed lawsuits against the franchisor for mismanagement. 
 
The franchisees’ desire for autonomy and incongruent goals form a challenge for headquarters 
when trying to implement change. This challenge is even larger for transformational changes as 
compared to incremental changes. An example of an incremental change in a chain is the 
introduction of healthy alternatives such as apple slices and yogurt drinks in the McDonald's 
Happy Meal. Transformational changes require more franchisee investments and may result in 
more resistance, and thus require greater management focus. A recent example is the turnaround 
at McDonald's that was announced by CEO Steve Easterbrook in May 2015. This change 
requires costly equipment upgrades by franchisees (reportedly between $120,000 and $160,000) 
to adopt the ‘Create Your Taste’ strategy, resulting in several complaining franchisees covered 
by the media. 
 
We look at the implementation of transformational changes to a chain's business format to better 
understand how to effectively manage this complex process. We conducted in-depth case studies 
in two large and competing Dutch drugstore franchise chains (ETOS and DA) that aimed to 
redesign their business formats during the increasing internationalization and competition in the 
early 2000s. We discuss the effectiveness of different change approaches and provide insights 
into how to promote desired and prevent undesired franchisee responses. The change process at 
ETOS was successful, whereas the one at DA was not. Comparing these change processes 
provides some valuable lessons on how to best manage changes in franchise chains. These 
lessons can be applied to other business contexts as well, especially chains with a centralized 
corporate organization and geographically dispersed units. 
 
Druggists in distress: two contrasting cases 
 
The Dutch Drugstore Context 
 
Historically, the product range of Dutch drugstores consists of four types of product 
groups: health (including nonprescription medicines), beauty, personal grooming, 
and miscellaneous product groups (including hair accessories). In the past decades, three 
drugstore chains have dominated the Dutch drugstore market: ETOS, DA, and Kruidvat. 
 
The history of ETOS goes back to 1918 when personnel at Philips Electronics in Eindhoven 
started a cooperation with stores that could provide them with cheap day-to-day groceries. In 
1973 the Dutch chain of Albert Heijn supermarkets took over all ETOS stores and turned them 
into drugstores. Both Albert Heijn and ETOS became subsidiaries of AHOLD, also founded in 
1973. For many years, the ETOS chain consisted of only company-owned stores, but the number 
of ETOS franchisees grew steadily after the first franchisee started in 1988. ETOS gradually 
evolved from a discounting chain with only company-owned units to a high-quality chain with 
both company-owned (50%) and franchised units (50%) that all operated under a standardized 
business format. 
 
The history of the DA chain goes back to World War II, when five Dutch druggists initiated a 
cooperative called ‘DA’. They mainly wanted to establish a support network to share attractive 
purchasing deals. In the decades that followed, the number of DA members grew quickly, and 
DA turned into a ‘cooperative franchise chain’ with a central headquarters and a somewhat 
standardized business format. Even though headquarters had the formal rights to impose 
obligations on the DA franchisees, they did not do so for many years. DA franchisees highly 
valued their entrepreneurial autonomy and many of them wore white overcoats to indicate their 
professionalism. DA headquarters always aimed for only franchised units in the chain, no 
company-owned units. As is common in the Netherlands, both DA and ETOS had mainly single-
unit franchisees; multi-unit franchisees usually only owned two or three units. 
 
Compared to ETOS and DA, Kruidvat is a relatively young chain as it was started in 1975. It has 
always been a discounting drugstore chain with only company-owned units. The chain very 
quickly gained market share over time. In 1997, Kruidvat took over another discounting chain 
with only company-owned units (Trekpleister), and in 2002, both were bought by the China-
based conglomerate AS Watson. 
 
Distress at ETOS and DA 
 
From the 1970s on, the Dutch drugstore industry faced radical changes in the business 
environment, which also affected DA and ETOS. First, a number of discounting drugstore chains 
– including Kruidvat – entered the market, confronting druggists with heavy price competition. 
Second, the entry of perfumery chains – such as Parfumerie Douglas in 1980 – challenged the 
traditionally strong position of Dutch druggists in perfumes and cosmetics. Third, new chains 
that integrated drugstore, perfumery, and pharmacy activities were emerging on the Dutch 
market, including the British Boots chain. Fourth, competition increased further as other 
nontraditional distribution channels – such as gasoline stations – began to offer health and 
personal care products. A final disturbing development was the start of a discussion at the Dutch 
government about opening up the market for nonprescription medicines. 
 
In response to the above threats, both DA and ETOS headquarters initiated strategic changes 
from 2000 on. ETOS headquarters considered ETOS as being ‘squeezed’ between the discounter 
Kruidvat on the one side, and DA with its high market positioning on the other. ETOS 
headquarters thought that it could not win the discount race and decided to upgrade ETOS with 
the ‘Four Worlds Format’ with a more luxurious store presentation and assortment. In 2000, 
ETOS introduced this format to its franchisees, aiming at all company-owned and franchised 
units to be transformed by the end of 2006. 
 
Already since the mid-1990s, DA headquarters had tried to move in the opposite direction 
through repositioning. Headquarters thought that DA's luxurious and white-coat market 
positioning ‘scared away’ customers to the benefit of Kruidvat. In the 1990s, DA headquarters 
introduced a new business format with a more affordable look and with more low-margin and 
non-drugstore products. However, the implementation of these changes had not gone smoothly 
as a large number of DA franchisees had rejected them. In 2003, a new management aimed to 
accelerate DA's intended repositioning by introducing the ‘DA-2005 business format’ with a 
fresh-looking store presentation and even more low-margin drugstore and non-drugstore 
products. Management also introduced a more standardized franchise contract to all DA 
franchisees to further increase standardization and to create a more uniform market image. 
 
Change formulation and implementation 
 
The change process at ETOS was more successful than at DA. This difference in outcome can be 
explained by several reasons that are related to various stages of the change process. Change 
literature distinguishes a variety of stages in planned change, but for the sake of simplicity we 
distinguish between two stages: ‘change formulation’ and ‘change implementation’. 
 
Change Formulation 
 
Change formulation may take several weeks or months and typically involves analyzing the 
situation, developing a shared vision and a common goal. A characteristic of franchise 
relationships is that goals of the headquarters and the franchisees are not totally aligned: 
headquarters’ strategy is typically focused on chain sales and growth in the number of units, 
whereas franchisees are mostly interested in unit profitability. Hence, it is very important to set 
joint goals between headquarters and franchisees regarding the change process. For example, 
franchisee representatives must be involved early in the strategy formulation process. 
 
Between DA and ETOS there was a clear difference regarding franchisee involvement during 
change formulation. ETOS had a Franchise Advisory Council with clear procedures, but at DA 
several franchisees accused the headquarters of ‘favoritism’, ‘unfairness’, and ‘fake franchisee 
involvement’ caused by a lack of clear procedures on the (s)election of franchisee representatives 
and these representatives’ rights. 
 
Change Implementation 
 
Change implementation generally takes much longer and involves the communication of the 
changes to organizational members and the members’ adaptation of practices and routines. The 
formulation and implementation stages are interrelated because the formulation stage has to 
anticipate potential problems in the implementation stage, and how the formulation process is 
executed sets the stage for successful or unsuccessful implementation. 
 
At DA the franchisees perceived headquarters’ communication regarding the changes as 
‘authoritarian’ and ‘arrogant’ and felt that they were forced to ‘take it or leave it’. Given that 
DA-franchisees had always been granted a considerable level of autonomy, they generally 
considered headquarters’ change approach as unacceptable. ETOS adapted the format in 
consultation with the franchisees (leading, for example, to the use of cheaper store materials) and 
used the company-owned units as pilots showing that they were prepared to invest in the changes 
themselves. 
 
A typology of change approaches 
 
Four Change Approaches 
 
Table 1 presents four corporate change approaches that headquarters can take regarding their 
franchised units and describes their costs and benefits from different viewpoints: the 
headquarters, the customers, and the relationship between headquarters and franchisees. In 
practice, headquarters may adopt combinations of these approaches. 
 
 
 
The first change approach is standardization, which means forcing each franchisee to adopt the 
changes. The second one is customization, which implies allowing for differences between 
franchisee groups in timing or extent to which they have to adopt the changes. The third one is 
empowerment: defining outcomes that the franchisees need to achieve by their individual or 
collective action. The final approach that we observe in practice but do not recommend, is the 
muddle through approach. Organizations that muddle through typically have not developed clear 
goals and/or implementation strategies, and/or they are not enforcing them. 
 
Both standardization and customization are top-down approaches in which headquarters is 
responsible for the implementation process. The consequences are very different. The 
standardize approach aligns with highly uniform and strict franchising business formats. Even 
within a single franchise chain, franchisees are likely to differ in their personalities, goals and 
local circumstances, so at least some of the franchisees will disagree with the imposed changes 
and may lose trust because they feel that the headquarters does not take into account their 
interests. Moreover, with the standardization approach, strict monitoring of the franchisees’ 
actual implementation of the changes will be necessary and will lead to additional costs. 
 
A customization approach will show the franchisees that the franchisor is willing to recognize 
special circumstances which will improve their trust, but mainly at the expense of less clarity for 
customers. Designing and implementing a customized change is relatively complex, and 
although one may expect less resistance by individual franchisees, monitoring the 
implementation process is still necessary. 
 
The other two approaches do not entail top-down implementation, but actually lay the initiative 
in the hands of the franchisee. In the empowerment approach, the franchisees will feel respected 
and trusted. The headquarters will still need to monitor whether the change goals are met, but 
unit control is less complex and less expensive than process control. When the implementation 
approach is actually just muddling through, costs will be high, customers will be disappointed, 
and the relationship between headquarters and franchisee will deteriorate. This is what ultimately 
happened in the DA case. 
 
Approaches at DA and ETOS 
 
Both DA and ETOS used the standardization approach in their change processes; however, with 
different consequences. Since the group of DA franchisees had always been heterogeneous in 
terms of unit type and franchisee goals, the franchisor's standardization approach automatically 
led to a sizeable group of franchisees perceiving a misalignment of goals and a lack of trust, as 
they perceived the franchisor not to take into account their interests. This resulted in franchisees 
adopting destructive responses and ultimately in a ‘muddling through’ approach by headquarters 
as it did not dare to further enforce the changes and running the risk of losing too many 
franchisees. At ETOS the standardization approach resulted in fewer problems as the group of 
franchisees overall was more homogeneous because ETOS only starting franchising when they 
already had a large number of standardized company-owned units. ETOS had selected 
franchisees that were willing and able to meet these standardization prerequisites. 
 
In sum, when determining a change implementation approach, headquarters have to take into 
account the level of complexity and control costs on the one hand, and unit and customer 
satisfaction on the other hand. The level of heterogeneity among franchisees in terms of their 
goals, personalities and local circumstances is an important factor: the more heterogeneous the 
franchisees are within a system, the more difficulties to be expected with the standardization 
approach. 
 
A typology of franchisee responses 
 
Franchisees have their own goals and ideas and may show various responses to franchisor-
initiated chain-wide changes. We provide a typology of franchisee responses to change that is 
based on the intent of these responses. The intent of a response can be constructive, aimed at 
reviving or maintaining the relationship, or destructive, aimed at ending or destroying the 
relationship. Within these broad classes, there are passive and active responses. For example, 
stalling for more time is a passive response, while leaving the franchise system is definitely an 
active response. We describe six types of responses that franchisees can adopt when being 
confronted with franchisor-initiated changes to the business format. 
 
Constructive Responses 
 
Negotiate 
 
Franchisees make active and constructive efforts to improve conditions, taking into account their 
own and the franchisor's concerns. Two different forms of negotiation responses occur. First, 
franchisees may not agree with the adaptations introduced by the franchisor, and feel the need to 
speak up and try to stop or at least impede the intended changes. Second, franchisees may overall 
agree with the changes, but they may want to be actively involved in discussing future 
developments and even want to speed up the change process. 
 
Stay 
 
Franchisees decide to remain loyal to the system and focus on maintaining the franchise 
relationship and adopt the changes with little or no discussion. There is no fighting or 
negotiation. 
 
Stall 
 
Franchisees are in doubt how to react to the franchisor-imposed changes, and they wait to see 
how the situation evolves before adopting further responses. Such behavior is a passive response. 
Stalling is a temporary ‘state of mind’; once the situation develops, these franchisees are likely to 
switch to other responses. The stall response is difficult for franchisors to detect and may be 
interpreted incorrectly by the headquarters as staying when the franchisee actually ends up 
leaving the franchise system. The CEO of DA at the time of the changes said to us: “A passive 
person is difficult to assess. It makes a great deal of difference whether I, as the CEO, ask a 
druggist a question, or whether you, as a researcher, ask it. You might obtain different answers”. 
 
Destructive responses 
 
Leave 
 
Franchisees decide to terminate their franchise relationship by continuing the business under 
their own name, by joining another franchise system, or by liquidating their business. 
Franchisees’ exit possibilities depend on the contractual and structural characteristics of their 
franchise relationships. For example, in the Netherlands – and especially at DA before and 
during the 2000s – it was relatively easy for franchisees to leave since there were few contractual 
restrictions and franchisees often owned their premises, whereas in the US this is typically much 
more difficult because of legal contracts. 
 
Fight 
 
Some franchisees want to ‘win’ without considerations for the concerns of the franchisor. For 
example, franchisees may file a lawsuit or threaten to do so, complain about the franchise system 
in the media, or withhold fees. Franchisees can also collectively engage in a fight response by 
joining forces to put more pressure on their franchisor. For example, this response can be 
adopted by small, single-unit franchisees who do not have much power on their own and who 
want to share the costs of their actions by filing a class-action lawsuit. In the DA case some 
franchisees jointly wrote a letter to the franchisor to file their complaints. A more recent example 
would be 50 small Dutch Bakker Bart bakeries that jointly filed suit against their franchisor in 
2014 because it drastically raised their rents during economic stagnation. 
 
Hide 
 
Franchisees may also simply neglect their duties to the detriment of the interests of the 
franchisor. In other words, the franchisees disengage. An example is one DA franchisee who told 
us that he signed the new franchise contract, but intended not to adhere to it and would wriggle 
out of many of the new requirements by just neglecting them. He expected to get away with this 
because the headquarters so far never really enforced changes (‘muddling through’). 
 
Consequences of franchisee responses 
 
Different types of franchisee responses have different consequences for the implementation of 
change. For franchisors the stay response is probably most convenient, but the other responses 
may pose threats if not managed effectively. For example, DA headquarters often misinterpreted 
the stall response for staying and many of the ‘stallers’ eventually left the chain, resulting in 
major problems for the headquarters. The hide, fight, negotiate and leave responses led to an 
important ‘implementation trade-off’ for both DA and ETOS headquarters. To what extent 
should management ‘give in’ to prevent further destructive franchisee responses, especially when 
these were high-performing franchisees with valuable locations? 
 
At ETOS the implementation trade-off was less important than at DA because fewer ETOS 
franchisees adopted destructive responses. During the repositioning in the 1990s, DA already 
struggled with the implementation trade-off causing headquarters not to enforce the changes, 
resulting in a ‘muddling through’ approach and a failed change process. This may explain why 
the new DA management chose the standardization approach in 2003; it really wanted 
franchisees to take it or leave it. However, this again resulted in large scale destructive franchisee 
responses and – again – a difficult implementation trade-off for DA. 
 
Ultimately, many franchisees left DA in reaction to the change processes. Franchisee 
disagreement with the change processes was the main cause of DA losing more than 600 of its 
1,000 stores over a period of about 20 years. As a result, the DA chain began a downward spiral: 
economies of scale decreased and overhead costs of DA headquarters became too high, leading 
to serious financial problems. In 2009, the DA headquarters had to be rescued from bankruptcy 
by a large external investor. For ETOS, the number of stores has grown from about 440 stores in 
2003 to over 500 stores in 2015 with the same 50% split between company-owned and franchise 
units. 
 
Factors affecting franchisee responses 
 
Three Main Factors Affecting Responses 
 
Given the decisive consequences of franchisee responses to headquarter-initiated change, an 
important question is what causes these responses. Similar to other relationships that people 
engage in (marriage, friendship or employment), the franchise relationship is only maintained if 
it fits the franchisee's needs and if it is not easy and attractive to switch to another partner. We 
distinguish between three main criteria that franchisees use to assess their relationship when 
transformational change is introduced: relationship value, relational constraints, and trust. 
The value the franchise relationship brings to the franchisee is mainly determined by profit and 
strategic fit. A franchise is a commercial endeavor which means that unit profit will always be an 
important criterion for franchisees to assess the value of the relationship. Additionally, the 
franchise chain should fit the franchisees’ fundamental strategic management desires, such as the 
level of autonomy granted and the actual market positioning of the business format. 
 
Relational constraints are determined by the presence of attractive alternatives and the costs of 
switching to these alternatives. Switching to another chain means investing in new facilities but 
perhaps also paying fines for breach of contract. With only a few alternatives and/or high 
switching costs, the relational constraints are high. 
 
The third but ultimately most important factor franchisees consider in their responses to change 
is their confidence that the headquarters has the ability and intention to make the relationship 
work – whether they can trust their headquarters. 
 
Explaining Franchisee Responses at DA 
 
In the DA case, a sizeable group of franchisees experienced problems regarding their unit 
profitability, strategic fit and their trust in the headquarters. Many DA franchisees expected the 
changes to result in lower unit profitability because the system level promotion activities were 
mainly aimed at generating additional turnover resulting in higher fees for the franchisor – as 
franchise fees were largely based on turnover levels – but also higher unit costs and ultimately 
lower unit profitability. 
 
Additionally, these franchisees expected lower strategic fit regarding DA's lower market 
positioning and higher standardization level because they still valued DA's original values of 
professional advice and entrepreneurial autonomy. 
 
Moreover, many of these franchisees had a low level of trust in the DA headquarters due to their 
experiences with ‘arrogant management’ during DA's repositioning in the 1990s. This lack of 
trust really became a problem during the changes in the 2000s with the requirement to sign a new 
contract with higher financial investments and lower levels of autonomy. As one DA-franchisee 
said: ‘Would you sign a long-term contract with a partner whom you do not trust?’ The 
combination of low trust and a lower level of expected autonomy led to franchisees feeling at the 
mercy of a suspect franchisor. This led to a ‘straightjacket effect’ and thus strong destructive 
franchisee responses. 
 
Explaining Franchisee Responses at ETOS 
 
At ETOS it was easier for headquarters to formulate changes that would positively affect 
franchisees’ unit profitability and perception of strategic fit (and thus relationship value) because 
franchisees were more homogeneous in terms of types of unit locations and goals. 
Moreover, ETOS franchisees had higher levels of trust in headquarters as the company 
‘institutionalized’ several instruments in the chain to enhance trust among the franchisees. These 
included the Franchise Advisory Council with clear procedures, franchise fees based on 
franchisees’ purchasing value rather than turnover, and company-owned units. Because ETOS 
calculated fees over the purchasing value, franchisees felt that their franchisor did not have an 
interest in just increasing turnover levels. Also, the franchisor would not simply increase 
purchasing prices because these were the same for company-owned and franchised units, and this 
was monitored by an accountant. 
 
ETOS headquarters deliberately aimed for a predetermined division between company-owned 
and franchised units. It always wanted the turnover of the company-owned units to be at least 
51% of the ETOS system's total turnover to provide a convincing sign to the franchisees. One 
franchisee explained why he was convinced to adopt new goods: ‘Because ETOS has company-
owned units, the goods we sell need to produce profits; therefore, the interests of ETOS and its 
franchisees run parallel.’ A balance between company-owned and franchised units in a chain 
helps in balancing headquarters’ and franchisees’ interests and in convincing franchisees to 
implement changes. 
 
A model for understanding franchisee responses 
 
Fig. 1 presents a simplified decision tree regarding franchisees’ initial responses to 
transformational change. As the figure shows, a franchisee's trust in the headquarters is the 
primary issue. 
 
 
 
Responses When Trust is Low 
 
If trust is low, franchisees are very likely to adopt destructive responses: leave, fight or hide. The 
franchisee's response then depends on relational constraints. When the constraints are low, 
franchisees tend to leave, and when the constraints are high, franchisees tend to fight or hide. 
However, some even leave despite high constraints; their trust is so low that they just want to get 
out of the relationship. This especially happened at DA. Some of the DA franchisees’ exit 
responses seemed irrational because their relationship value (unit profitability and strategic fit) 
and relational constraints were still high. However, their lack of trust made them want to 
‘punish’ the headquarters by leaving the relationship. 
 
Responses When Trust is High 
 
If trust is high, franchisees will move on to assess the expected value of the relationship after the 
changes. The relationship value is based on the franchisee's expected satisfaction with unit profit 
and the perception of strategic fit with the franchise system in terms of market positioning and 
level of autonomy. In case of high trust and low relationship value, franchisees are likely to 
negotiate and to discuss their concerns with the franchisor to find a mutually beneficial solution. 
Negotiations can occur multiple times, until franchisees believe there is no more room to 
negotiate. 
 
If the expected relationship value becomes high as a result of these negotiations, the franchisee is 
inclined to stay. If the expected relationship value remains low, the franchisee will assess the 
relationship constraints. Low constraints make a franchisee more inclined to leave, whereas in 
case of high constraints the franchisee is most likely to hide or fight. These hide or fight 
responses negatively affect the chain because they delay change implementation and they may 
result in bad publicity and a bad reputation among the chain's stakeholders, including prospective 
franchisees, potential investors and the general public. The stall response mostly occurs when 
things are unclear. This happened very often at DA because of headquarters’ muddling through 
approach. 
 
The Impact of Time 
 
Fig. 1 is a simplified version of reality. The most important complication is that change 
processes take time, and time may change everything. For example, as franchisees gain more 
information and interact with the franchisor, their assessment of unit profit and strategic fit may 
change. The franchisor may also alter the content of the changes during the process. Sometimes, 
external parties even purposefully influence the process. At DA, for example, competitors 
actively approached franchisees with attractive deals to entice them to switch chains. 
 
A final complicating factor is that during negotiations franchisees’ trust in headquarters can be 
affected negatively. When this happens the franchisee may skip the assessment of relationship 
value and switch to destructive responses. This means that franchisees switch between different 
responses over time. For instance, DA's largest franchisee made such response switches. This 
franchisee owned nearly 20 stores, whereas most DA-franchisees had just one store. His initial 
response to the changes was to leave because he had experienced a decrease in trust and 
relationship value over time. However, his response changed to a stay response because the 
franchisor did not want to lose him and took the initiative to negotiate. The franchisee eventually 
stayed and said: ‘Initially I rated my satisfaction with the relationship as low, but now it is 
higher. My satisfaction was low at the time I wanted to leave… At one point the headquarters 
contacted me to negotiate about my contract and they then took a different approach by 
involving me in headquarters’ decisions.’ 
 
Recommendations 
 
‘The only thing that is constant is change’. 
– Heraclitus (535 B.C.E. – 475 B.C.E.) 
 
Organizations have always been confronted with changing business landscapes that require 
business model redesigns. Given the growing speed of developments, effectively implementing 
transformational changes is an increasingly important organizational capability that is required 
for organizational prosperity and survival. We have focused on chain organizations as many of 
them have become very successful by replicating a business format on a large scale. Yet, a 
successful business format today does not provide guarantees for a successful format tomorrow. 
We identify lessons to be learned that can help chain organizations, and specifically the ones 
with franchised units, to manage change more effectively in the future. 
 
Recommendations for Strategy Formulation 
 
Regarding strategy formulation, the following recommendations apply: 
 
• Given that goals of the headquarters and franchisees are not totally aligned, it is 
important to involve franchisees early on in the change process by setting joint goals that 
every partner understands. Headquarters needs to recognize that franchisees aim for unit 
profitability, although they may not be rational financial optimizers. It is wise to include a 
number of franchisees in the strategy formulation process who can represent all the other 
franchisees’ interests, such as on a Franchise Advisory Council. It is important to 
formulate clear procedures for the Council, most specifically on the (s)election of 
franchisee representatives and their rights and obligations. 
 
• It is imperative to take into account franchisee and unit heterogeneity caused by 
differences between individuals and between local circumstances – even within a single 
franchise chain. If franchisee and unit heterogeneity within a chain are high, it is 
important for headquarters to foresee potential problems with relationship value (strategic 
fit and unit profit) for specific franchisee groups. 
 
Recommendation for Strategy Implementation 
 
Recommendations regarding strategy implementation: 
 
• Headquarters should be aware of different change implementation approaches. In 
determining their approach, headquarters have to take into account the level of 
complexity and control costs on the one hand, and franchisee and customer satisfaction 
on the other hand. In implementing changes, headquarters have to deal with an important 
implementation trade-off between really enforcing changes on franchisees and bowing to 
the pressure of franchisees’ destructive responses, particularly those of valuable 
franchisees. This trade-off can easily lead to a muddle through approach, which should be 
avoided at all times. 
 
• The heterogeneity of franchisees and units in the chain largely determines which change 
approach is suitable; a standardization approach may be desirable because of its relative 
simplicity and efficiency, but it only seems suitable for chains with homogenous 
franchisees and units. For more heterogeneous chains the customization or empowerment 
approaches will probably be more appropriate than the standardized approach. In case a 
chain is heterogeneous, headquarters should understand the causes of this heterogeneity 
in order to manage the relationship value for each type of franchisee in the chain. If 
possible, avoid or actively manage franchisee heterogeneity by careful franchisee 
selection and training. 
 
• Franchisees’ trust in headquarters is always very important. Franchisees may ‘punish’ the 
headquarters if they do not trust them; they may adopt destructive responses even when 
their expected relationship value and the relational constraints are high. Franchisors can 
take various structural measures to improve trust, such as initiating a Franchise Advisory 
Council, using a fee structure based on purchasing value (with monitoring by an 
accountant), investing in a sizeable group of company-owned units and using them as 
pilots when introducing changes. Relational measures are important as well, such as 
having open communication, and a non-authoritarian leadership style. 
 
• Trust in the headquarters becomes extremely relevant in situations where franchisees 
experience high and/or growing standardization and thus a loss of autonomy. The 
combination of a lack of trust and a low autonomy may lead to a ‘straightjacket effect‘, 
which makes franchisees react very strongly to proposed changes. 
 
• It does not really pay off for franchisors to increase franchisees’ constraints, such as 
financial switching costs, because unhappy franchisees that do not expect improvements 
in trust and relationship value will adopt destructive responses anyway. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Franchise chains occupy a growing segment of the economy. They are unique legally 
independent units, which jointly form a network with a specific business format that is valuable 
and recognizable to the customer. As consumers, we are familiar with them worldwide. We are 
also aware when they are managed effectively and when they are managed badly. We encourage 
managers to examine the complexities of chain-wide change before implementation; to bring 
about constructive franchisee responses by involving the franchisees early on in the change 
process, and to recognize how franchisee responses can change over time and that trust is needed 
to maintain an effective relationship. 
 
The complexities of implementing chain-wide change require a full benefit and cost analysis. In 
the end, managers and franchisees must clearly understand why and where the change is taking 
them. We encourage managers to consider the insights provided in this article and how they 
might be applied at the corporate and unit level in order to deal with current and future dynamic 
environments. Because ultimately, ‘When you’re finished changing, you’re finished’, Benjamin 
Franklin (1706–1790). 
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